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Abstract
Does postponing minimum retirement age improve healthy behaviours before 
retirement? 
Evidence from middle-aged Italian workers**
By increasing the residual working horizon of employed individuals, pension reforms that 
raise minimum retirement age are likely to affect the returns to investments in health-
promoting behaviours before retirement, with consequences for individual health. 
Using the exogenous variation in minimum retirement age induced by a sequence of 
Italian pension reforms during the 1990s and 2000s, we show that Italian males aged 
40 to 49 reacted to the longer time to retirement by raising regular exercise and by 
reducing smoking and regular alcohol consumption. Dietary habits were also affected, 
with positive consequences on obesity and self-reported satisfaction with health.
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Introduction  
There is substantial research in health economics exploring the causal effects of retirement on 
individual health and health behaviours. This literature consistently reports that the transition 
into retirement has positive short-term effects both on self-reported health and on indices of 
physical health. Recent evidence includes Insler, 2014, for the U.S., Coe and Zamarro, 2011, 
and Eibich, 2015, for Europe and Zhao et al., 2013, for Japan. Some studies emphasize the 
positive changes in health-promoting behaviours – such as additional physical exercise and 
reductions in drinking and smoking – when explaining the positive effects of retirement on 
overall health (Celidoni and Rebba, 2015, and Kaempfen and Maurer, 2016).1 These positive 
effects, however, may be short-lived and disappear with time (the so-called ‘honeymoon 
effect’ of retirement).2  
The causal impact of retirement on health is typically identified using the exogenous 
variation provided by changes in the eligibility conditions for early or full retirement, that 
affect retirement patterns without having a direct impact on health (see Coe and Zamarro, 
2011). These changes, however, affect not only the individuals who are close to eligibility, 
but also younger individuals, and in particular those who – in the absence of constraints – 
would choose an optimal retirement age that falls below the minimum required by retirement 
rules. Therefore, optimal health behaviours may change even before retirement. 
Compared to the growing evidence on the impact of retirement on health, less is known on 
the effects of a longer working horizon on individual behaviours before retirement, and what 
                                                
1 Conversely, Godard, 2016, finds that the retirement transition has a positive effect on the 
incidence of obesity among European workers. This effect is particularly pronounced among 
those who were employed in blue-collar and physically demanding jobs. The studies on the 
effects of retirement on cognition generally find negative effects (see Rohwedder and Willis, 
2010, Adams et al., 2012, Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012, and Celidoni et al., 2013). The 
evidence is less clear-cut for mental health (see Charles, 2004, Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 
2009, Johnston and Lee, 2009, Clark and Fawaz, 2009, Bonsang and Klein, 2012, Bertoni 
and Brunello, 2014, and Fonseca et al., 2015). 
2 For instance, Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2014, and Bertoni et al., 2015, estimate that - given 
age - a longer time spent in retirement has a negative effect on an index of overall physical 
health and on muscle strength, a robust predictor of disability, cardiovascular diseases and 
mortality. 
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is known does not include health-promoting behaviours. Hairault et al., 2010, for instance, 
shows that French workers exposed to an exogenous increase in their expected retirement age 
increase job search effort. They explain this finding by showing that the economic returns to 
jobs depend on their expected duration, which increases with retirement age. Following a 
similar argument, Montizaan et al., 2010, and Brunello and Comi, 2015, use Dutch and 
Italian data and show that policies that increase the residual working horizon have positive 
consequences on training participation by active older workers.3 In a study especially close to 
ours, De Grip et al., 2012, find that a Dutch reform reducing pension rights and postponing 
the minimum retirement age of public sector workers has reduced their mental health. 
In this paper, we use data on several cohorts of middle aged Italian working men during the 
period 1997 to 2011 to study the impact of changes in minimum retirement age – induced by 
reforms affecting eligibility conditions – on health-promoting behaviours before retirement. 
By considering only male workers aged 40 to 49, we focus on individuals who are generally 
not eligible for retirement and at the same time are not too far from it. Changes in health-
promoting behaviours affect health. Health before retirement is likely to be higher among 
middle aged men if better health increases the net utility gains associated to a longer working 
horizon. For instance, if earnings and employment in the additional period before retirement 
depend on health, affected individuals have an incentive to keep fit so as to reap these 
benefits.  
Italy provides an interesting setup for the issue at hand, because of the sequence of pension 
reforms that occurred during the period under study (see e.g. Angelini et al., 2009). Even 
before these reforms, eligibility for early retirement required in most cases that social security 
contributions be paid for at least 35 years. The sequence of reforms progressively tightened 
eligibility requirements in terms of both age and accrued years of contributions, thereby 
                                                
3 Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014, find that the same policies negatively affected job 
satisfaction of treated Dutch workers. A longer working horizon may also have inter-
generational consequences on the children of potential retirees. Manacorda and Moretti, 
2006, find negative effects of a longer parental working horizon (and thus higher parental 
income) on the nest-leaving decisions of Italian youngsters. Battistin, et al., 2014, find that 
policies raising the retirement age have negatively affected the supply of informal childcare 
provided by Italian grandparents, thereby reducing the number of grandchildren. 
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generating exogenous variation in the expected minimum retirement age for comparable 
workers observed in different years – when different retirement laws were in place. 
We study the effects of changes in minimum retirement age on health-promoting behaviours, 
including regular exercise, refraining from smoking and drinking alcohol regularly, and 
dietary habits such as refraining from eating red meat or imbibing soft drinks at least once a 
day, and eating fruit or vegetables at least once a day. We also consider the effects on the 
body mass index.4  
Our empirical approach relies on instrumental variables. In Italy, the minimum time to 
retirement combines age requirements – that are clearly exogenous – and requirements on the 
years of paid social security contributions, that depend on individual careers and are likely to 
be endogenous, because negative health shocks affect both health behaviours and working 
careers. We instrument minimum actual years to retirement, computed using information on 
the actual years of paid contributions, with minimum potential years to retirement – obtained 
by replacing the number of years of paid social security contributions with potential 
experience – measured as age minus school leaving age, a pre-determined variable in our 
setup. Conditional on age-by-school leaving age dummies, sector dummies and non-linear 
trends in birth cohort, the only remaining source of variation in the instrument is generated by 
the different retirement rules in place in different years – which are exogenous to individual 
choices. 
We find that a one-year increase in minimum actual years to retirement increases the 
likelihood of exercising regularly by 3.28 percentage points (equivalent to 15.74 percent of 
the mean value of the outcome in the full sample) and the likelihood of refraining from 
smoking and drinking regularly by 3.22 and 2.50 percentage points (equivalent respectively 
to 4.88 and 5.40 percent of the mean value of the outcome in the full sample). There is also 
evidence that a longer time to retirement reduces the consumption of red meat and soft 
drinks, and the prevalence of obesity, although these estimated effects are imprecise. Overall, 
self-reported high satisfaction with own health also increases.  
We hasten to stress that the range of health behaviours observed in our data does not exhaust 
all the important behaviours that may affect health. For instance, we do not have information 
on the use of illicit drugs or unsafe sex. Yet our evidence is highly suggestive that postponing 
retirement may improve health before retirement.  
                                                
4 Cawley and Ruhm, 2011, treat obesity as an health behaviour.  
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During the sample period 1997 – 2011, mean years to retirement in our data increased by 
about three years. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the longer minimum 
working horizon has had important effects on measured health-promoting behaviours, raising 
the frequency of regular exercise by more than 9.8 percentage points – equivalent to more 
than 40 percent of the mean value of the outcome in the full sample, a large amount – and 
reducing the incidence of smoking and regular drinking by 9.6 and 7.5 percentage points, 
equivalent respectively to about 15 and 16 percent of the mean value of the outcomes in the 
full sample. 
Since these effects are sizeable, especially for physical activity, a natural concern is that the 
observed trend in minimum retirement age is capturing the negative trend in several risky 
health behaviours, described for instance by Cawley and Ruhm, 2011, for the United States, 
and by the OECD, 2015. To dispel this concern, we control for the long-term changes in 
behaviours that are not attributable to pension reforms by including in our regressions  a 
time-varying index of each behaviour for individuals not affected by these reforms (males 
aged 65 to 75) or only marginally affected (females aged 40 to 49 who are not in the labour 
force or males aged 25 to 30). However, irrespectively of the chosen control group, our 
qualitative results are unchanged. 
Understanding the effects of a longer working horizon on behaviours before retirement is 
important. Several OECD countries have recently introduced pension reforms that raise 
minimum retirement age in order to deal with the increased burden of population ageing on 
public finances. By delaying retirement and by increasing the residual working horizon of 
employed individuals, these reforms may generate unexpected costs and benefits. In this 
paper, we highlight that one benefit could be better health before retirement, as constrained 
individuals react to the longer horizon by investing in healthy behaviours and reducing 
unhealthy ones. Ceteris paribus, in countries with universalistic public health care, better 
health before retirement may generate important savings, and these savings should be 
accounted for when evaluating the impact of pension reforms.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the institutional background 
and the sequence of pension reforms affecting minimum retirement age in Italy. Section 2 
presents the data. We discuss the empirical setup in Section 3 and results in Section 4. 
Conclusions follow. 
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1. Institutional Background: Recent Italian Pension Reforms 
To cope with the fiscal consequences of population ageing, starting from the early 1990s 
many European countries – including Italy – have undertaken structural changes in their 
social security systems, including significant increases in minimum retirement age. In this 
paper, we focus on the sequence of Italian social security reforms that took place between 
1997 and 2011 – the period covered by our data – and repeatedly changed retirement 
eligibility rules.5 
Before 1992, the minimum age for old-age pension for men was 60 for employees in the 
private sector and for self-employed workers, and 65 for public sector employees - 
conditional on having paid social security contributions for at least 15 years. Early retirement 
with a seniority pension was instead possible at any age for workers who had paid social 
security contributions for at least 35 years.6 The first social security reform (the so-called 
“Amato” reform – from the name of the Prime Minister at the time of its implementation) 
took place in 1992 and introduced a progressive increase in the requirements for eligibility to 
old age pensions, that were expected to reach at least 20 years of paid contributions and age 
65 by 2001, as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
In 1995, a second major reform (the “Dini” reform) tightened the eligibility requirements for 
seniority pensions, that were to raise gradually from 1996 to 2008 until either 40 years of 
paid contributions independently of age, or 57 years of age and 35 years of paid 
contributions.7 The reform also prescribed a faster increase of eligibility requirements for the 
self-employed, as documented in Table A2 in the Appendix, where we summarize all 
changes in seniority pension eligibility rules introduced by the reforms of interest. After only 
                                                
5 We exclude the Fornero reform, that substantially changed eligibility rules in 2012. See 
Angelini et al., 2009, and Bottazzi et al., 2011, among others for further details on the 
pension reforms occurring during our sample period.  
6 Since our empirical analysis is restricted to men, we do not discuss here the changes in 
pension eligibility rules that apply to females. 
7 By introducing eligibility requirements for seniority pensions, this reform abolished the so-
called “baby-pensions”, that since 1973 allowed public employees with at least 20 years of 
paid contributions to retire independently of age. This requirement was set as low as 14 years, 
6 months and 1 day for married women with children who were employed in the public 
sector. 
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three years, in 1998, pension eligibility rules changed again with the “Prodi” reform, that 
accelerated the transition period and increased the minimum retirement age to 58 for the self-
employed. 
The fourth reform took place in 2005, when Welfare Minister Roberto Maroni changed again 
the eligibility requirements for seniority pensions, introducing a sharp 3-year increase in 
minimum eligibility age (the so-called “scalone”) from 57 to 60 years for public and private 
employees, and from 58 to 61 for the self-employed, starting from year 2008. However, in 
2007, the new left-wing government led by Romano Prodi (or “Prodi bis”) postponed the 
proposed 3-year increase to 2011, introducing instead a gradual adjustment in the 
requirements, starting again from 2008, as documented in Table A2. For this reason, no 
worker has actually retired under the requirements prescribed by the “Maroni” reform. Yet, 
this reform is still relevant for our purposes, as it changed the expected minimum retirement 
age for workers during the years from 2005 to 2008. In addition, under the “Prodi bis” 
regime, eligibility to seniority pensions was made conditional to achieving a further 
threshold, defined in terms of the sum of age and years of contributions – that also varies by 
year of retirement and sector (see Table A2).  
This sequence of reforms has generated exogenous variation in the minimum retirement age 
of workers with the same age, who have paid social security contributions for the same 
number of years and belong to the same sector, but are observed in different years (i.e. were 
born in different cohorts), when different retirement laws were in place. To isolate this 
variation from endogenous changes in the length of working careers, we define potential 
years to retirement PYR at time t as the minimum number of years to retirement prescribed by 
the law in place at the time, when the years of paid social security contributions are set equal 
to the years of potential labour market experience, or the difference between age and school 
leaving age.8 This measure differs from actual years to retirement YR, that are based instead 
on actual rather than potential labour market experience.  
We illustrate how PYR varies over time with the example shown in Table 1, where we 
consider hypothetical private sector employees aged 40, 45 and 49 in 1991, 1997, 2001, 2007 
and 2011, who started their continuous careers at age 19, after completing secondary school. 
                                                
8 By so doing, we are assuming that individual labour market careers are continuous. We 
compute school leaving age as the canonical number of years required to complete the 
highest attained school degree plus six – the school starting age. 
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It turns out that PYR increased from 14 in 1991 to 19 in 2011 for those aged 40, from 9 to 14 
years for those aged 45 and from 5 to 10 for those aged 49. Especially for older workers, the 
bulk of this increase occurred between 1997 and 2011.  
Pension reforms in Italy have also modified pension benefits. The major change occurred in 
1995, before the start of our sample period, with the transition from a system based on 
defined benefits to a system using defined contributions. Another important change occurred 
instead during our sample period, when in 2007 the second Prodi government (“Prodi bis”) 
reduced the coefficients used to transform accumulated contributions into pension benefits 
for workers retiring from 2010 onwards. Since this change could have altered health 
behaviours independently of the changes in minimum retirement age, we account for it in our 
empirical analysis.  
  
2. The Data 
Our data consist of two samples, a main and an auxiliary sample. The main sample is from 
the survey “Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana” (Aspects of Daily Life, hereafter AVQ), carried 
out on a yearly basis by the Italian Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), and the auxiliary sample is 
from the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian Households (SHIW from now on), 
conducted on a bi-annual basis by the Bank of Italy.  
AVQ is a cross-sectional annual survey implemented on a sample of about 50,000 
individuals. It covers several aspects of daily life, including behaviours such as exercising, 
smoking, drinking and dietary habits. We use the waves from 1997 to 2011 (for a total of 14 
different years, as in 2004 the survey did not took place), and focus on middle aged (age 40 to 
49) males, who are generally too young to be retired but not too far from retirement. We 
exclude females because their labour market careers – a crucial aspect of our empirical 
exercise – are often more discontinuous than those of men because of childbearing 
responsibilities. After eliminating from the sample the very few who are retired, disabled or 
have never worked in their life, as well as those with missing values in the variables used in 
the analysis we end up with a final sample of 38,966 individuals.  
We construct the following indicators of healthy lifestyles: a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individual exercises on a regular basis, and 0 otherwise; a dummy equal to 1 if he does not 
smoke, and 0 otherwise; a dummy equal to 1 if he does not drink alcohol regularly and 0 
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otherwise;9 a dummy equal to 1 if he refrains from eating red meat at least once a day and 0 
otherwise; a dummy equal to 1 if he eats vegetables or fruit at least once a day, and 0 
otherwise; a dummy equal to 1 if he refrains from imbibing soft drinks at least once a day, 
and 0 otherwise; and a dummy equal to 1 if his BMI is below 30 (not obese), and 0 otherwise. 
We also define as indicator of health satisfaction a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is very 
satisfied with his own health, and 0 otherwise.  
We plot in Figure 1 for our sample period the average values of these indicators as well as 
PYR. On the one hand, the percentages exercising regularly, not smoking and not drinking 
regularly have increased over time; on the other hand, the percentage not eating red meat at 
least once a day has been rather stable, and the percentages eating fruits and veggies and 
refraining from drinking soft-drinks at least once a day – available only since 1998 – have 
declined. Figure 2 shows that the percentage not obese – available only from 2001 – and the 
percentage reporting very good health are more or less constant over time. 
The AVQ survey includes also variables that we use as additional covariates in our 
regressions: age, educational attainment, sector of employment (private, public or self-
employment), type of job (whether physically demanding or not), type of accommodation, 
marital status and presence of children. While the survey has data on individual current 
labour market status, there is no information on previous labour market history. Because of 
this, the total years of paid social security contributions are not available, and we can only 
construct their potential value PYR.  
We supplement this information with that from our auxiliary sample, that has data on (self – 
reported) years of paid social security contributions at the time of the interview, but is silent 
on health-promoting behaviours. This sample consists of 8,549 males aged 40 to 49 from 
1998 to 2010 (7 different surveys), for whom we can compute both PYR and YR.10  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables introduced in this section. In our main 
sample, 21 percent of the individuals exercise regularly, 66 percent do not smoke, 46 percent 
do not drink alcohol regularly, 83 percent do not eat red meat at least once a day, 85 percent 
                                                
9 We define regular drinking if the individual drinks at least 1 or 2 glasses of either wine or 
beer per day, or if he drinks alcohol outside meals on a daily basis. Our data do not have 
information on binge drinking. 
10 The main and the auxiliary sample are broadly comparable in terms of observable 
characteristics.  
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eat fruits or vegetables at least once a day, 86 percent do not drink soft drinks at least once a 
day and 89 percent is not obese. In addition, 20 percent are very satisfied with their health. 
While the actual minimum number of years to retirement YR is 15.24, the potential number 
PYR is about three years shorter at 12.23. The percentage of individuals with at least a high 
school diploma is 43 percent; 29 percent are self-employed and 18 percent are public sector 
employees; 67 percent live in a standard apartment, 84 percent are married and 19 percent 
have no children. Finally, 31 percent work in a physically demanding job.   
 
3. The Empirical Approach 
Galama et al., 2013, have recently developed a structural model of consumption, leisure, 
health, health behaviours, wealth accumulation and retirement decisions using the human 
capital framework of health developed by Grossman, 2000. We present in the Appendix a 
simplified version of Galama et al.’s model with the purpose of illustrating how changes in 
minimum retirement age minR affect healthy behaviours. 
In this model, the health stock is in the utility function both during working life and during 
retirement and also affects earnings during working life. Individuals cannot modify their 
health stock directly but can invest in costly healthy behaviours, which affect current and 
future health. The optimal health investment before retirement equalizes the marginal current 
and future benefits of better health to the marginal costs of attaining it. Optimal retirement 
age R is also subject to choice, and it is jointly determined with consumption and investment 
in healthy behaviours. 
Exogenous changes in minimum retirement age minR  affect only the individuals with an 
optimal retirement age equal to or lower than minR . For these individuals, an increase in 
minR  promotes investment in healthy behaviours if the marginal benefits of better health 
during the additional period of active working life – in terms of higher utility and earnings - 
are higher than the marginal costs – in terms of the investment costs and of the foregone 
benefits due to the shorter retirement period.  
Let the optimal time to retirement chosen by an individual aged A in the absence of any 
constraint be ARYR*  . Let instead YR be the actual minimum time to retirement, that 
depends on the set of exogenous retirement rules  minmin CS,R ,  where minCS  is the 
minimum number of years of paid social security contributions required to access early 
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retirement, on individual age, and on accumulated social security contributions at age A, 
defined as CS.  
By modifying minR  and minCS , policy makers can alter minimum time to retirement, which 
in turn affects the behaviour of individuals for whom YRYR*  holds. We model the 
empirical relationship between actual minimum years to retirement and healthy behaviours as 
follows 
itititit XYRB                         (1) 
where the indices i and t are for the individual and time, B is for healthy behaviours, X is a 
vector of controls, that includes age by school leaving age dummies, dummies for sector of 
employment and a cubic trend in cohort of birth, and ε is the error term. Since our sample 
consists of male workers aged 40 to 49 and in Italy transitions from a sector to another are 
infrequent in this age range,11 we treat both school leaving age and sector of employment as 
pre-determined variables. 
The parameter β measures the marginal effect of a one-year increase in the actual minimum 
time to retirement on healthy behaviours. Denote with s the share of individuals with 
YRYR*   and assume that u  and c  are the marginal effects of YR on B for the sub-groups 
with YRYR*   and YRYR*  , respectively. Then 





s
YR
YR
ss
YR
B
c 1 , because 
0u . Therefore, the estimated marginal effect of YR in (1) compounds the effect on the 
sub-group with YRYR*   and the effect on the share of individuals who are constrained by 
the minimum retirement age.  
As discussed in Section 2, the sequence of pension reforms introduced by Italian 
governments during the 1990s and 2000s repeatedly modified both the minimum retirement 
                                                
11 Using quarterly data from the Italian Labour Force Survey, we estimate the following year-
to-year average transition rates across sectors for workers aged 40 to 49 during the years 
2004 to 2011: 1.44 percent from self-employed to private sector employee; 0.23 percent from 
self-employed to public sector employee; 0.09 percent from private to public sector 
employee; 0.25 percent from private sector employee to self-employed; 0.08 percent from 
public to private sector employee and 0.03 percent from public sector employee to self-
employed. 
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age minR and the minimum number of years of paid social security contributions ( minCS ) 
required to access to retirement with a seniority pension. These changes – that have been 
specific to the self-employed and to public and private sector employees – have generated 
variability over time in the minimum number of years to retirement among workers of the 
same age, who paid social security contributions for the same number of years and belong to 
the same sector (i.e. private, public, self-employed). 
Since eligibility requires a minimum number of years of paid social security contributions, 
YR is shorter for workers with no employment gaps in their careers, even conditional on age, 
sector and school leaving age. One reason for observing discontinuous careers is the 
experience of negative health shocks – either currently or in the past – which in turn may 
depend on the adoption of unhealthy behaviours. These shocks generate reverse causality, as 
people who experience bad health – or adopt unhealthy behaviours – also end up having a 
longer working horizon. In this case, conditioning on vector X does not suffice in preventing 
OLS estimates of β in Eq. (1) from being inconsistent.  
We address reverse causality by instrumenting YR with PYR, the potential years to retirement, 
or the minimum residual working horizon under the assumption of continuous careers. 
Contrarily to YR, the selected instrument does not depend on individual careers and varies 
with age, retirement eligibility conditions and education, that are either exogenous or 
predetermined for the relevant age group (40 to 49). Conditional on the variables in vector X, 
the residual variation in PYR is due exclusively to the changes in retirement rules that took 
place over the years – which we treat as exogenous to individual behaviour.  
In the reduced form equation, 
RititRitRRit XPYRB                      (2) 
the identification of parameter R  as the intention to treat effect of PYR on B requires that, 
conditional on vector X, PYR is as good as randomly assigned. In support to this assumption, 
we show that - as one would expect if PYR can be treated as random given X - the estimates 
of R  in (2) are broadly unaffected by the inclusion of an additional set of pre-determined 
covariates that are likely to correlate with B - including dummies for region of residence, type 
of accommodation (a proxy for wealth), marital status, the presence of kids and working in 
physically demanding jobs. The estimated value of R  is also largely unaffected when we 
add time-varying macroeconomic factors (GDP per capita and the relative prices of each 
13 
 
outcome of interest), that are likely to influence the adoption of healthy behaviours and to 
correlate with changes in eligibility requirements. 
In a similar fashion, if healthy behaviours exhibit a long-term positive trend and this trend is 
not included in (2), a positive correlation between B and PYR may simply reflect the omitted 
trend rather than the effect of pension reforms. To avoid this, we estimate a specification of 
(2) that includes as an additional control the variable gtB , defined as the average regional 
value of B for three alterative groups (g): a) males aged 65 to 75, who are not affected by 
pension reforms; b) females out of the labour force and aged 40 to 49, who are also unlikely 
to be affected; c) young males aged 25 to 30, who are far enough from retirement to disregard 
changes in PYR in their current behaviours. As reported below, we find that – independently 
of the selected control group – the estimates of R  are only marginally affected. 
The identification of parameter β in Eq. (1) as the (Local) Average Treatment Effect of YR on 
B requires two additional conditions: first, we need a significant first-stage relationship 
between YR and the selected instrument PYR. Visual evidence that such relationship exists is 
reported in Figure 3, where we plot the distribution of YR and PYR in our auxiliary sample, as 
well as the linear regression fit, showing a strongly positive association between the two. 
Formal evidence is discussed in the next section. Second, we require that PYR influences B 
only via its effect on YR, a tenable exclusion restriction in this context.12 
As described in the previous section, our key data source - the ISTAT AVQ survey - has 
detailed information on the adoption of healthy behaviours, but no information on the years 
of paid social security contributions. Since we cannot compute YR using these data, we can 
only estimate the reduced form equation (2). We estimate parameter β in Eq. (1) using our 
auxiliary SHIW sample and Two-Sample Instrumental Variables (TSIV) (see Angrist and 
Krueger, 1992 and Inoue and Solon, 2010).13 Letting π be the effect of PYR on YR in the first 
                                                
12 We also require a monotonicity condition (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994), stating that 
exposure to longer YR cannot lead to shorter PYR. 
13 We estimate the first stage using data for 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. 
Even if we observe in this dataset the accrued years of social security contributions, we still 
need to assume continuous careers from the time of observation until retirement (see Battistin 
et al., 2009). 
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stage regression, our IV estimate of parameter β is obtained as the ratio 
 R .14 In all 
regressions, we cluster standard errors by cohort, sector and school leaving age. 
We estimate equations (1) and (2) for each behaviour separately. However, since the error 
terms associated to the different behaviours can be correlated, we also jointly estimate the 
system of reduced form equations using seemingly unrelated regressions, but find no 
significant change in the standard errors. We also test whether the coefficients associated to 
PYR in the reduced form equations are jointly equal to zero, and strongly reject this 
hypothesis (p-value<0.01). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
If pension reforms that raise minimum retirement age affect at least part of the relevant 
population, and workers understand the effects of these changes, average expected retirement 
age should raise as YR increases. To document that this is the case, we use our auxiliary 
sample drawn from SHIW – where individuals are asked about their expected retirement age 
– and regress expected retirement age on minimum age and on the vector of controls X. We 
estimate that a one year increase in minimum retirement age raises expected age by about 
half a year (0.54, standard error 0.02).15  
We estimate equation (2) using a linear probability model and report in Table 3 the estimated 
effects of potential minimum time to retirement PYR on healthy behaviours. The table reports 
both the estimated coefficients (multiplied by 100) and the percentage effects computed with 
respect to the mean of the outcome variable. Panel 1 is for the most parsimonious 
specification, that only includes vector X; panel 2 includes additional individual controls; 
panel 3 further includes the real GDP per capita, the relevant relative price – measured as the 
price of the outcome relative to the average price - and gtB , the regional value of B for males 
aged 65 to 75, who are not affected by changes in PYR; panels 4 and 5 are similar to panel 3 
                                                
14 Inference is carried out by bootstrapping. Notice that, since there is a single endogenous 
variable and the model is just identified, our estimation procedure is equivalent to a Two-
Sample Two-Stage Least Squares procedure, which involves computing the fitted values of 
YR in the ISTAT AVQ data using the first-stage coefficients estimated in SHIW.  
15 See Bottazzi et al., 2006, for additional evidence.  
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except that we use the regional trends in the relevant outcome for males aged 25 to 30 and for 
females aged 40 to 49 who are out of the labour force.  
Focusing on Panel 1, we find that increasing the residual (potential) working horizon PYR 
significantly improves several healthy behaviours. We estimate that a 1-year increase in PYR 
raises the probability of practicing sports regularly by 5.92 percent and reduces the 
probability of smoking and drinking alcohol on a regular basis by 1.83 and 2.03 percent 
respectively. These are statistically significant effects. In addition, increasing PYR by one 
year affects nutrition habits by reducing the likelihood of eating read meat and consuming 
soft drinks at least once a day by 0.69 and 0.78 percent respectively – although the former 
effect is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. We also detect a small but 
imprecisely estimated positive effect of higher PYR on the consumption of fruits and 
vegetables. Consistently with these dietary improvements, there is also evidence that a higher 
value of PYR increase the probability of not being obese, albeit this effect is imprecisely 
estimated.16 Finally, we find that a longer time to retirement improves the probability of 
being very satisfied with own health. 
Reassuringly for our identification strategy, introducing additional covariates to vector X – 
see Panel 2 - does not change our results. Similarly, we do not detect stark changes in our 
findings even when we also add macroeconomic controls and regional trends in the outcome 
variable for males who are unaffected by the reforms, males very far from retirement age or 
females aged 40 to 49 who are out of the labour force – see Panels 3 to 5. Because of this, we 
will focus hereafter on the most parsimonious specification in Panel 1.  
Our empirical findings are robust to several changes in specification. First, Table A3 in the 
Appendix shows that results are similar when we compute the marginal effects of PYR on 
behaviours using a Probit specification instead of a linear probability model. Second, we 
verify whether the linear relationship between behaviours B and PYR - adopted in Eq. (2) - is 
overly restrictive by adding to our baseline specification a quadratic term in PYR. As reported 
in Table A4 in the Appendix, this term is never statistically significant at the conventional 
five percent level of confidence, which lends support to the baseline versus the quadratic 
                                                
16 This effect is statistically significant at the ten percent level of confidence in less 
parsimonious specifications.  
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specification.17 Next, we re-define our outcomes as ordinal variables, but out qualitative 
results are still unchanged. For instance, in the case of exercising we distinguish between no 
exercising, light physical activity, irregular and regular exercising, and find that an additional 
year to retirement has a negative and positive effect of similar size on the former two and 
latter two categories respectively.   
Last but not least, we consider the potential confounding effects on our estimates of changes 
in pension replacement rates, that could have modified healthy behaviours independently of 
changes in PYR. The relevant change during our sample period is the method of computation 
of pension benefits, that was altered starting in 2007 for those who could retire from 2010 
onwards. To control for this effect, we add a dummy equal to 1 for individuals observed in 
years 2007-2011 and eligible to retire since 2010, but find no change in our results.18   
To investigate whether responses to changes in YR are heterogeneous, we estimate separate 
regressions by sector of activity (private employees, public employees, self-employed 
workers), level of education (below or above high school) and type of job (physically and not 
physically demanding job), and report results in Table 4. We find that changes in minimum 
retirement age have virtually no effect on public sector workers and generally stronger effects 
among the better educated. On the one hand, the better educated may respond more to 
changes in minimum retirement age because they typically are more forward looking and 
more likely to incorporate future expected changes into their current behaviour. On the other 
hand, public employees in Italy have stronger job guarantees than private sector workers, and 
therefore may be less concerned with preserving their health in order to work longer. As 
expected, we also find that a longer time to retirement does not alter the likelihood of 
carrying out regular physical activity by those who are already engaged in a physically 
demanding job.19 
We have presented so far the intention to treat effects of higher potential minimum time to 
retirement on healthy behaviours. We now turn to estimating the effects of the actual 
minimum time to retirement YR on these behaviours, using potential time PYR as the 
                                                
17 A specification with dummies for each level of PYR also lends support to the linearity 
assumption. 
18 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
19 Since we find that regular working hours are unaffected by changes in PYR, we conclude 
that additional regular exercise occurs mainly during leisure time. 
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instrument for actual time and Two-Sample Instrumental Variables. First, we regress actual 
time on potential time and the vector of control X in our auxiliary SHIW sample, and report 
the result at the bottom of Table 5. According to our estimates, a 1-year increase in PYR 
increases YR conditional on X by 0.38 years. Since the value of the first-stage F statistic for 
instrument weakness is 28.06, well above the threshold of 10, our instrument is not weak. 
Second, we compute for each behaviour the Two-Sample IV estimate of β as 
R , and show 
our results in the first row of the table (multiplied by 100). We estimate that the IV effects of 
YR on B are about 2.5 times larger than the ITT estimates shown in Table 3. When evaluated 
at mean values, a one-year increase in the actual minimum time to retirement increases the 
likelihood of exercising regularly by 15.74 percent and reduces smoking and drinking by 4.88 
and 5.4 percent. We also confirm that higher time to retirement induces a reduction in the 
consumption of red meat and soft drinks and in obesity, although these estimates are often 
imprecise. Finally, health satisfaction increase by 9.23 percent (statistically significant at the 
10 percent level). 
These are sizeable effects, especially for physical activity. Back-of-the-envelope calculations 
show that, during the sample period 1997 – 2011, mean years to retirement in the SHIW 
sample increased from 17 to 20 for those aged 40 and from 8 to 11 for those aged 49. Our 
estimates based on the linear specification and the Two-Sample IV method indicate that these 
changes have had important effects on healthy behaviours, raising the average probability of 
regular exercising from 0.21 to 0.30 (+45%), of not smoking from 0.66 to 0.77 (+16%) and of 
not drinking regularly from 0.46 to 0.52 (+13%). 
  
Conclusions  
We have investigated the effects of postponing minimum retirement age on healthy 
behaviours before retirement using data on several cohorts of middle aged Italian working 
men during the period 1997 to 2011, when repeated pension reforms took place in an effort to 
contain public expenditure. Because these reforms generated exogenous variation in 
minimum retirement age,  Italy is an interesting laboratory to study the issue at hand.  
While much research has been devoted to establishing whether and how retirement affects the 
health of retired individuals, less has been done to understand whether policy measures that 
alter the length of the residual working horizon can affect health and healthy behaviours even 
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before retirement. We have estimated the causal effect of changes in the potential as well as 
actual minimum number of years to retirement on the health lifestyles of Italian workers aged 
40 to 49, who can be 8 to 20 years away from minimum retirement age, and found that  - 
when evaluated at the mean value of each outcome - a one-year increase in minimum actual 
years to retirement raises the likelihood of exercising regularly by 15.74 percent and reduces 
smoking and regular drinking by 4.88 and 5.4 percent. Furthermore, a longer time to 
retirement increases the probability that red meat and soft drinks are consumed less, and that 
fruit and vegetables are consumed more frequently. Because of the improvement in dietary 
habits, there is also some evidence that obesity declines. Consistently with these findings, we 
also estimate a positive effect on self-reported high satisfaction with health.  
Pension reforms that raise minimum retirement age have been introduced in several OECD 
countries to deal with the increased burden of population ageing on public finances. By 
delaying retirement and by increasing the residual working horizon of employed individuals, 
these reforms may reap unexpected dividends. We have highlight that one such dividend 
could be better health before retirement, as constrained individuals react to the longer horizon 
by investing in healthy behaviours and reducing unhealthy ones. Better health before 
retirement may generate important savings to private and public expenditure, and these 
savings should be accounted for when evaluating the overall impact of pension reforms.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Potential years to retirement (PYR) and average healthy behaviours. Years 1997-2011 
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Figure 2. Potential years to retirement (PYR), obesity and self - reported good health. Years 1997-
2011 
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Figure 3. Years to retirement: YR and PYR - Bank of Italy SHIW data 1998-2010. 
 
Notes: the figure reports a scatterplot and a linear fit of YR on PYR in Bank of  Italy SHIW data from 1998 until 
2010. Micro-data are collapsed by YR and PYR. Darker dots indicate cells with higher density. The linear fit is 
obtained from micro-data.  
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Table 1. Simulated potential years to retirement (PYR) for workers aged 40, 45 or 49, starting to work 
at 19, observed in 1991, 1997, 2001, 2007, and 2011. 
 
Notes: see Tables A1 and A2 for pension eligibility requirements under the different reforms. 
  
Age Year Reform Contributions paid PYR
     
40 1991 - 21 14 
40 1997 Dini 21 17 
40 2001 Prodi 21 17 
40 2007 Maroni 21 19 
40 2011 Prodi Bis 21 19 
     
45 1991 - 26 9 
45 1997 Dini 26 12 
45 2001 Prodi 26 14 
45 2007 Maroni 26 14 
45 2011 Prodi Bis 26 14 
     
49 1991 - 30 5 
49 1997 Dini 30 6 
49 2001 Prodi 30 8 
49 2007 Maroni 30 10 
49 2011 Prodi Bis 30 10 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Treatment Variable 
YR 
 
Instrumental Variable: 
15.24 
 
 
4.50 
 
 
PYR 12.23 3.72 
   
Outcomes:   
Exercises regularly 0.21 0.41 
Does not smoke 0.66 0.47 
Does not drink alcohol regularly 0.46 0.50 
Does not eat red meat at least once a day 0.83 0.38 
Eats fruit or vegetables at least once a day 0.85 0.36 
Does not drink soft drinks at least once a day 0.86 0.34 
Not obese 0.89 0.31 
Very satisfied with health 0.20 0.40 
   
Other covariates:   
5-year college degree 0.10 0.31 
3-year college degree 0.01 0.1 
High school diploma 0.32 0.47 
Professional high school diploma 0.08 0.27 
Junior high school diploma 0.39 0.49 
Primary school diploma 0.08 0.27 
No schooling 0.01 0.08 
Public employee 0.18 0.38 
Self-employed 0.30 0.46 
Lives in a luxury apartment 0.08 0.27 
Lives in a standard apartment 0.67 0.47 
Lives in social housing 0.14 0.35 
Lives in a country house 0.03 0.17 
Lives in sheltered housing 0.01 0.05 
No kids 0.19 0.39 
Married 0.84 0.36 
Works in physically demanding job 0.31 0.46 
Notes: Data for “YR” are from the Bank of Italy SHIW survey, all other data are from the ISTAT AVQ survey. 
Both samples includes male workers aged 40 to 49 who do not have missing values in the variables reported in 
the table. Total number of observations in SHIW: 8,549. Total number of observations in AVQ: 38,966. “Does 
not drink soft drinks at least once a day” is only observed since 1998 (N = 35,829) and “Not obese” since 2001 
(N = 25,862). “YR” is the actual work horizon, or the number of years before becoming eligible to retire 
according to the rules in place at the time of the interview and using the observed number of years of social 
security contributions. “PYR” is the potential work horizon, computed using the potential number of years of 
social security contributions. The excluded school degree is “doctorate or equivalent”. The excluded 
occupational sector is “private employee”. The excluded accommodation type is “villa or single house”.  
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Table 3. The effect of potential years to retirement (PYR) on healthy behaviours – OLS estimation – linear 
probability models.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Exercise 
regularly 
No 
Smoking 
No 
alcohol 
regularly 
No red 
meat  
at least 
once a 
day 
Fruit or 
vegetables 
at least once 
a day 
No soft 
drinks 
at least 
once a 
day Not obese  
Very 
satisfied 
with health 
          
Panel 1: includes age by school degree dummies, sector dummies and a cubic trend in cohort 
 
PYR/100 1.23*** 1.21*** 0.94** 0.57* 0.31 0.67** 0.53 0.70** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.31) (0.27) (0.30) (0.35) (0.33) 
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 
5.92*** 1.83*** 2.03** 0.69* 0.36 0.78** 0.59 3.47** 
 
Panel 2: includes as additional covariates regional dummies, type of accommodation dummies, having kids, 
being married and working in physically demanding jobs 
 
PYR/100 1.22*** 1.16*** 0.86** 0.53* 0.29 0.63** 0.57 0.72** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.40) (0.30) (0.27) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32) 
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 
5.86*** 1.76*** 1.86** 0.63* 0.34 0.73** 0.64 3.57** 
 
Panel 3: includes as additional covariates with respect to Panel 2 the real GDP per capita, relative prices and 
regional trends in the relevant outcome for males aged 65-75 
 
PYR/100 1.21*** 1.10*** 0.84** 0.53* 0.21 0.63** 0.68* 0.72** 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32) 
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 
5.79*** 1.67*** 1.81** 0.63* 0.25 0.73** 0.76* 3.58** 
 
Panel 4: as Panel 3 but with regional trends in the relevant outcome for males aged 25-30 
 
PYR/100 1.23*** 1.10*** 0.83** 0.53* 0.23 0.61** 0.67* 0.76** 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32) 
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 
5.88*** 1.67*** 1.8** 0.64* 0.27 0.70** 0.75* 3.8** 
 
Panel 5: as Panel 4 but with regional trends in the outcome for females not in the labour force aged 40 to 49. 
 
PYR/100 1.22*** 1.10*** 0.88** 0.54* 0.16 0.61** 0.67* 0.74** 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.40) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32) 
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 
5.86*** 1.67*** 1.89** 0.64* 0.18 0.71** 0.75* 3.67** 
Notes: the table reports the estimated effects of PYR/100 on the health behaviour listed at the top of each column. 
Percentage effects are computed with respect to the mean value of the outcome in the full sample. Total number of 
observations: 38,966; for “No soft drinks at least once a day”: 35,829; for “Not Obese”: 25,862. In Panel C, we include 
the relative price of recreational activities in the equation for exercising, tobacco in the equation for smoking, alcohol in 
the equation for alcohol, meat in the equation for red meat, fruit and vegetables in the equation for fruit and vegetables, 
soft drinks in the equation for soft drink, and overall food and recreational activities in the equation for obesity. All 
price data come from the Italian National Statistical Office. Standard errors clustered by cohort, school leaving age and 
sector in parentheses.  ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Effects of potential years to retirement (PYR) on healthy behaviours – OLS estimation – linear 
probability models. By different groups. % effects with respect to mean outcomes. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Exercise 
regularly 
No 
Smoking 
No 
alcohol 
regularly 
No red 
meat  
at least 
once a 
day 
Fruit or 
vegetables at 
least once a 
day 
No soft 
drinks at 
least 
once a 
day 
Not 
obese 
Very 
satisfied 
with 
health 
 
Panel 1. By sector of activity  
Public sector 0.71 1.77 0.97 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05 0. 40 -4.24 
 
Private sector 
(including self-
employed) 
 
5.61*** 1.73*** 2.13** 0.69* 0.47 0.76** 
 
 
0.67 3.84** 
Panel 2. By education 
Low education 0.19 0.13 1.11 0.22 0.20 0.48 0.23 -0.27 
         
High education  2.37 2.15** 4.06** 0.89 -0.07 0.05 1.75 5.46* 
         
Panel 3. By type of job 
Job not physically 
demanding 6.34*** 1.25** 1.50 0.38 0.27 0.72* 
 
0.07* 1.29 
         
Job physically 
demanding 0.47 2.20** 2.36* 0.85 0.63 0.60 -0.49 6.12** 
         
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Table 5. The effect of YR on healthy behaviours – Two-sample IV estimation – linear specification  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Exercise 
regularly 
No 
Smoking 
No 
alcohol 
regularly 
No red 
meat  
At least 
once a 
day 
Fruit or 
vegetables 
at least 
once a 
day 
No soft 
drinks at 
least once 
a day Not obese 
Very 
satisfied 
with 
health 
         
YR/100 3.28*** 3.22** 2.5* 1.51 0.81 1.79* 1.4 1.85* 
 (1.25) (1.27) (1.29) (0.94) (0.85) (1.03) (1.13) (1.12) 
         
% effect 
w.r.t. mean 
outcome 15.74*** 4.88** 5.4* 1.82 0.96 2.07* 1.57 9.23* 
         
First-stage 
PYR/100 0.38***       
 
 (0.07)        
First-stage 
F statistic 28.06       
 
Notes: the table reports the estimated effects of  years to retirement YR on the health behaviours listed at the top of each 
column. Percentage effects are computed with respect to the mean of the outcome in the full sample. All regressions 
control for age by school degree dummies, sector dummies and a cubic trend in cohort, as in Table 3 – Panel A. The 
first stage is estimated in the SHIW sample for the years 1998-2010. Total number of observations in SHIW: 8,549.  
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by cohort, school leaving age and sector in parentheses (1,000 bootstrap 
replications). ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 
1. An illustrative model  
Following Galama et al., 2013, we consider an individual in his forties who intends to spend his 
residual lifetime partly at work and partly in retirement. In each period before retirement, his utility 
is given by  
)H,C(UU ttwwt            (A.1) 
where C is consumption and H is the health stock in period t.  
Let tB  be a strictly positive measure of health investment (or healthy behaviour) and tp  its unit 
cost.20 For instance, this investment can be an healthy diet or physical exercise. The relationship 
between health and health investment is given by the following law of motion 
tt
t HB
t
H 
           (A.2) 
By increasing tB , the individual can compensate the natural decay of health. Using (A.2) we can 
write health at time t  as a function of initial health and of the entire history t't 0  of health 
investment 'tB   
dxeBeHH )xt(
t
x
t
t
 
0
0         (A.3) 
In the optimization problem, we optimize with respect to the entire prior history of health 
investment 'tB  (Galama et al., 2008, p.5).  
After retirement, individual utility is given by  
)H,C(UU ttrrt            (A.4) 
where γ>1 indicates that “…a dollar with leisure – while retired – is better than a dollar that is only 
had together with work…” (Stock and Wise, 1990, p.213). Denoting assets with tA , the inter-
temporal budget constraint is given by  
ttttt
t BpC)H(YA
t
A 
         (A.5) 
                                                
20 We broadly interpret the unit cost as including both monetary and non-monetary costs. We 
assume that there are no corner solutions in the optimal choice of health investments. See Galama et 
al., 2013, for a discussion. 
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where income Y is equal to yearly earnings )H(W t  before retirement and to Γ (pension benefits) 
after retirement. )H(W t  is an increasing and concave function of H, the health stock. Better health 
affects earnings both by raising productivity and by increasing the probability of being gainfully 
employed, but – as in Galama et al., 2013 – in the model we do not distinguish further between 
these two channels.  
Changes in minimum retirement age minR  affect individual choice only if minR  is binding, that is, 
if optimal retirement age is lower than or equal to minR . We shall focus on this case. The individual 
chooses consumption and healthy behaviours to maximize the following inter-temporal utility  
dte)]H,C(U[dte)]H,C(U[Max rtttrt
T
R
rt
ttwt
R
s min
min                           (A.6) 
subject to (A.3) and (A.5), where T denotes total lifetime, that we assume to be independent of 
health, as in Galama et al., 2013, s is initial age and r is the interest rate. Following Galama et al., 
2008, this is equivalent to maximizing  
  
T
s
t
ttttt
rt
ttrt
T
R
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dte]BpC)H(YA[dte)]H,C(U[dte)]H,C(U[Max
min
min
0   (A.7) 
where tt e  0 is the co-state variable associated to (A.5). The first order necessary condition for 
optimal 'tB  when minR't   is 
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min
min 00     (A.8) 
For consumption, the first order condition is  
)C,B(e
C
U
't't
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'wt 
  00                          (A.9) 
At the optimum, health investment when minR't   equalizes the marginal benefits during both 
active working life dte]
B
H
H
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t
t
wtR
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min 



  and after retirement dte]BHHU[ rt'tttrt
T
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



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)H(Yp[0 .  
Since the contribution of health to wages ends with retirement, we can re-write (A.8) as follows 
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Totally differentiating (A.8) and (A.9) with respect to minR , 'tB  and 'tC , we obtain 
0
0
21
321

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't't
min't't
dCdB
dRdCdB
 
where 
Zi 
  and Z includes minR , 'tB  and 'tC .  
By Cramer’s rule, we get that 


 32
min
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B  
where 1221  >0 because of the second order conditions. Since 2 is negative, the sign of  
min
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R
B

  depends on the sign of 3  and is positive if   
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In words, postponing minimum retirement age increases optimal healthy behaviours before 
retirement if the benefits of a longer working life induced by better health are higher than costs in 
terms of leisure due to a shorter retirement period. 
For the individuals who are not bound by minimum retirement age, optimal age R can be 
determined by inserting the optimal values of tC , tH and tB  into the indirect utility function V(R) 
and differentiating this function with respect to R. Galama et al., 2013, solve numerically for 
optimal retirement age R.  
When 0

min
't
R
B , the individual increases her healthy behaviours before retirement, and by so 
doing increases her health stock. After retirement, when minR't  , he maximizes 
  
T
s
t
ttttt
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T
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dte]BpCA[dte)]H,C(U[Max 0       (A.9) 
The first order necessary condition for optimal 'tB  is 
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Since the marginal utility of health is decreasing in the health stock, and the health stock at 
retirement is higher because of the postponed minimum retirement age, both the marginal benefits 
of additional health investments and the investments themselves are likely to fall just after 
retirement when minR increases.  
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2. Tables 
Table A1. Old-age pension eligibility during the sample period (1997-2011) 
 
Sector:  Private Public Self-employed
Retirement 
year: Age & YContr Age & YContr Age & YContr
1997 63+18 65+18 63+18 
1998 64+18 65+18 64+18 
1999 64+19 65+19 64+19 
2000 65+19 65+19 65+19 
2001 onwards 65+20 65+20 65+20 
Note: Y Contr: years of paid contributions. 
 
Table A2. Old-age pension eligibility according to the different reforms in place during the sample 
period (1997-2011) 
 
a. “Dini” reform. Survey years of application: 1997 
Sector: Private Public Self-employed 
Retirement 
year: Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr 
1997 52&35 36 52+35 36 56+35 40 
1998 53&35 36 53&35 36 57&35 40 
1999 53&35 37 53&35 37 57&35 40 
2000 54&35 37 54&35 37 57&35 40 
2001 54&35 37 54&35 37 57&35 40 
2002 55&35 37 55&35 37 57&35 40 
2003 55&35 37 55&35 37 57&35 40 
2004 56&35 38 56&35 38 57&35 40 
2005 56&35 38 56&35 38 57&35 40 
2006  57&35 39 57&35 39 57&35 40 
2007 57&35 39 57&35 39 57&35 40 
2008 onwards 57&35 40 57&35 40 57&35 40 
 
b. “Prodi” reform. Years of application: 1998-2004 
Sector: Private Public Self-employed 
Retirement 
year: Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr 
1998 54&35 36 53&35 36 57&35 40 
1999 55&35 37 53&35 37 57&35 40 
2000 55&35 37 54&35 37 57&35 40 
2001 56&35 37 55&35 37 58&35 40 
2002 57&35 37 55&35 37 58&35 40 
2003 57&35 37 56&35 37 58&35 40 
2004 57&35 38 57&35 38 58&35 40 
2005 57&35 38 57&35 38 58&35 40 
2006 57&35 39 57&35 39 58&35 40 
2007 57&35 39 57&35 39 58&35 40 
2008 onwards 57&35 40 57&35 40 58&35 40 
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c. “Maroni” reform. Years of application: 2005-2007 
Sector: Private Public Self-employed 
Retirement 
year: Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr Age & YContr Only YContr 
2005 57&35 38 57&35 38 58&35 40 
2006 57&35 39 57&35 39 58&35 40 
2007 57&35 39 57&35 39 58&35 40 
2008 60&35 40 60&35 40 61&35 40 
2009 60&35 40 60&35 40 61&35 40 
2010 onwards 61&35 40 61&35 40 62&35 40 
 
d. “Prodi bis” reform. Years of application: 2005-2007 
Sector: Private Public Self-employed 
Retirement 
year: 
Age & YContr & 
(Age+ YContr) Only YContr 
Age & YContr & 
(Age+ YContr) Only YContr 
Age & YContr & 
(Age+ YContr) Only YContr 
2008 58&35 40 58&35 40 59+35 40 
2009 59&35&95 40 59&35&95 40 60+35, 96 40 
2010 59&35&95 40 59&35&95 40 60+35, 96 40 
2011 60&35&96 40 60&35&96 40 61+35, 97 40 
2012 60&35&96 40 60&35&96 40 61+35, 97 40 
2013 onwards 61&35&97 40 61&35&97 40 62+35, 98 40 
Notes: see Table A1. The requirement in terms of (age+ YContr) only applies since 2009  
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Table A3. The effect of years to retirement (PYR) on health behaviours – marginal effects from Probit 
estimation – linear specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Sports 
regularly 
Not a 
Smoker 
No 
alcohol 
daily 
No red 
meat  
daily 
Fruit or 
vegetables 
daily 
No soft 
drinks 
daily 
Not 
obese 
Very 
satisfied 
with 
health  
          
PYR/100 3.78*** 3.82*** 2.46** 2.16* 0.92 2.56* 2.57 2.50** 
 (1.20) (0.96) (1.05) (1.24) (1.19) (1.45) (2.14) (1.16) 
         
% effect 
w.r.t. 
mean 
outcome 5.04*** 2.08*** 2.06** .65* .26 .64* .53 3.47** 
Notes: the table reports the estimated average marginal effects of PYR on the health behaviour listed at the 
top of each column, obtained from Probit models. The controls included in the regressions reported in this 
table are those in Table 3 – Panel 1. Results for estimates with a richer set of controls are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
Table A4. The effect of potential years to retirement (PYR) on health behaviours – OLS estimation – 
quadratic specification  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Sports 
regularly 
Not a 
Smoker 
No 
alcohol 
daily 
No red 
meat  
daily 
Fruit or 
vegetable
s daily 
No soft 
drinks 
daily 
Not 
obese 
Very 
satisfi
ed 
with 
health 
          
PYR/100 0.02 1.57 2.19*** 0.73 -0.18 0.21 0.50 1.23 
 (0.60) (0.96) (0.79) (0.72) (0.63) (0.63) (1.65) (0.86) 
PYR/1002 0.05* -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
Notes: see Table 3. The controls included in the regressions reported in this table are those in Table 3 – Panel A. Results 
for estimates with a richer set of controls are available from the authors upon request. 
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